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1. Introduction 
In the electricity sector there are two different markets: the wholesale (or spot) 
market, in which electricity generators generate and sell electricity at a new price 
every half hour, and the retail market, in which electricity supply companies sell 
electricity to the final consumers. Supply companies tend not to change the price 
they charge their consumers very frequently, and so these companies typically 
enter into longer-term contracts for electricity with generators to avoid the risks 
they would face if they bought at a new price every half hour. Internationally, 
many electricity markets also include a specific capacity payment mechanism, 
which ensures generators receive sufficient revenue to cover their fixed costs, 
thereby incentivising investment. 
 
The Single Electricity Market (SEM) of the island of Ireland has been in place since 
2007. The market takes the form of a centrally-traded pool where all electricity is 
bought and sold. In 2014, the payments made to generators for the electricity 
they provided came to €2.2 billion and capacity payments came to €556 million.2 
Since the SEM was launched, wholesale electricity prices have tracked input fuel 
prices closely and the costs and bids of generators have been open and 
transparent.  
 
The European Union is working to harmonise electricity markets in its Member 
States by specifying a Target Model for electricity markets across Europe. The 
SEM has some technical features that render it incompatible with the European 
Target Model and so a number of changes to the market are necessary.3 The SEM 
will therefore be replaced by a new Integrated Single Electricity Market (I-SEM), 
                                                             
1  Di Cosmo acknowledges funding from Science Foundation Ireland, Grant No. 09/SRC/E1780. Lynch is funded by the 
Programme for Research in Third Level Institutions and is co-funded by the European Regional Development Fund 
(ERDF). Thanks to Sean Lyons for comments on a previous draft. Any remaining errors are the responsibility of the 
authors. 
2   See http://www.sem-o.com/pages/MDB_ValueOfMarket.aspx for full details. 
3  The rationale behind the Target Model is to promote efficient trading of energy between different countries. This 
includes allowing the cheapest generators to meet demand at each point in time while respecting their technical 
constraints, enhancing security of supply in each market, and facilitating the integration of renewable generation. 
 
* Valeria.diCosmo@esri.ie; Muireann.Lynch@esri.ie ESRI Research Notes 2015/1/1 
2 
which will be Target-Model compatible, by 2017. The new market will affect the 
spot and retail markets and the mechanisms through which supply companies 
buy electricity in advance to manage their risks.4 We have concerns about some 
possible undesired consequences of the new market design for the I-SEM, 
relating to both spot and retail markets. There are also proposed changes to the 
capacity payment mechanism which are of concern. 
 
Traditionally, electricity was generated and supplied to final consumers by state-
owned monopolies. In the past two decades, electricity markets worldwide have 
been liberalised, with many players competing in both generation and retail 
markets. Often, however, the legacy monopolist retains a large market share in 
generation and retail markets. The SEM is no exception.  
 
The legacy monopolist in the SEM has both a generation and a retail arm. Thus, 
one firm owns a large amount of the generation units on the system, provides a 
large proportion of total power generated and has the largest number of retail 
consumers. This allows the firm, in theory, to hide the true costs in each market 
by passing costs between its retail and generation arms. The legacy monopolist 
therefore has the potential to influence prices in both wholesale and retail 
markets. Any redesign of the SEM should take these structural issues, namely a 
low number of players and a dominant firm, into account. 
 
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 analyses the challenges facing the 
new I-SEM in spot and retail markets. Section 3 analyses the risks associated with 
the new capacity mechanism and Section 4 concludes. 
 
2. Market Power in Spot and Retail Markets: the Role of Forward Markets 
Both theoretical literature and international experience suggest that in order to 
promote competition in electricity markets with a small number of players, three 
measures may be employed. The first is where generators are required to base 
their bids on their true costs, and the regulator closely monitors spot market 
prices. The second is to improve the links between local and international 
electricity markets (this is achieved by building interconnectors). The final option 
is to incentivise local generators to commit to sell electricity at a competitive 
price in advance (this is achieved with a liquid forward market).5 These options 
should not be seen as exclusive, as they can successfully be integrated. In 
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particular, a liquid forward market can also prevent the retail price, which 
represents the ultimate cost to consumers, from rising in the long term, as we will 
discuss below. 
 
Competition in the current SEM spot market is currently ensured primarily 
through the first of these options, namely by regulating and monitoring spot 
market bids. This efficiently prevents generators from setting prices which do not 
reflect their true costs. This is achieved by the so called "Bidding Code of 
Practice", which legally requires generators to declare (or bid) their short-run 
marginal costs. This is the cost of producing one extra unit of electricity, and 
therefore is directly linked to generators’ costs of fuel and carbon. These short-
run marginal costs are bid separately from all other costs, such as the costs of 
starting or running the plant without producing electricity. Instead, generators 
include start costs and running costs in separate bids. Generators are also 
required to bid these other costs truthfully. 
 
In the I-SEM, a new bidding structure will be used, which will bring new 
challenges to the Irish electricity market. In particular, it will no longer be possible 
to declare the different components of generation costs (start costs, running 
costs and short-run marginal costs) separately. This may weaken the link between 
generators’ costs and market prices, and will also increase the responsibility 
generators must bear for ensuring their generation schedules are such that all 
their running costs are met. This new responsibility for meeting all costs may 
necessitate extra payments to generators. Furthermore it will be more difficult, 
but not impossible, for the regulatory bodies to impose conditions on the bids 
generators make in the new market, as they do at present. Given these 
limitations, in order to maintain the competitive spot market prices seen to date, 
we recommend that generators’ bids be monitored carefully by the regulatory 
authorities to prevent them from exhibiting strategic behaviour. 
 
Interconnection is the second of the three mechanisms through which 
competition is promoted. If there is a good level of interconnection between 
countries, generators compete not only within their country, but also with 
generators in other countries. In this case the number of market players is likely 
to be high enough to promote competition and, by extension, to keep electricity 
prices at their competitive level (which is the lowest level achievable). Although 
the efficient use of interconnectors will be beneficial for competition, the 
potential benefits and costs associated with higher interconnection levels may 
deserve further analysis. 
 
4 
The Irish market will be interconnected with the UK market, but not directly with 
Europe. As the UK market cannot be considered completely integrated with the 
rest of the European markets (i.e. the prices in the two zones won't necessarily 
always be the same), the existing interconnection is unlikely to open the Irish 
market to other EU players. Moreover, some companies in the UK are also 
owners of electricity companies in the Irish market, and this may reduce the 
benefits in terms of competition which can be gained through interconnection. 
Therefore the potential for interconnection to act as a means of ensuring 
competition in the new I-SEM, as with the current SEM, is limited. 
 
Forward markets are the third measure often used to promote competition in 
electricity markets. In forward markets, generators commit to sell electricity in 
advance at a certain price. However, forward markets are also unlikely to 
underpin effective competition in Ireland, because the SEM is probably too small 
to support a liquid financial forward market. More realistically, the main forward 
contracts in this market will be bilateral contracts between generators and 
suppliers. Nevertheless, forward markets could still contribute to competition in 
I-SEM if they are properly designed. In particular, forward markets should be 
transparent, with the forward prices emerging from bilateral contracts made 
public. 
 
If forward prices are made public, suppliers that earn high profits (which, in turn, 
will be associated with high retail prices) can be easily detected. This will provide 
a signal for new companies to enter the retail market and take advantage of the 
high profit margins. Furthermore, given the availability of such information on 
prices and suppliers, consumers can switch supplier and secure the best price. 
The regulator should facilitate such switching by ensuring there is sufficient 
information available to consumers. In particular, the regulator should require 
supply companies to publish all details of the components of the tariffs they 
applied to consumers who are not willing to switch their provider.6 Extra 
consumer charges to subsidise renewable generators should also be published 
separately. 
 
In summary, there are several challenges the I-SEM design encounters: it must 
keep spot prices at the lowest level achievable and ensure that supply companies 
transfer this price to final consumers, without earning extra profits. The low level 
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of interconnection and the lack of a liquid forward market may prevent the I-SEM 
from delivering an efficient price. Therefore, it seems regulation is the best way 
to ensure a competitive final price for consumers.  
 
In particular, regulation should monitor the quantity and the price of the forward 
contracts in order to ensure that forward sales are at a reasonable price.7 On the 
retail side, the regulator should require supply companies to publish the 
components of their tariffs, enabling consumers to make an informed decision 
when choosing supplier and to encourage new entrants if retail margins are high. 
 
3. New Capacity Payment Mechanism 
Capacity payments are payments made to generators to cover the fixed costs of 
the plant, as revenues from the sale of energy may not prove sufficient to ensure 
an appropriate level of investment arises. At present, capacity is paid for by 
dividing a capacity “pot”, the size of which is determined by the regulatory 
authorities, among all available generators. This mechanism will be replaced by a 
reliability options mechanism in the I-SEM.  
 
In a reliability options framework, generators participate in a competitive auction 
to hold reliability options in a given year. The total amount of options sold in the 
auction is equal to the estimated maximum level of electricity demand for the 
year. Thus consumers pay generators to hold reliability options, and in return 
receive assurance that there will be sufficient generation plants installed on the 
system to meet the maximum demand.  
 
Generators that hold reliability options can be called upon by the Transmission 
System Operator (TSO - i.e. the System Operator of Northern Ireland or EirGrid) 
to generate at periods of system stress. These are identified as periods when spot 
prices rise above a “strike price” which will be predetermined by a central 
regulating body and announced in advance of the reliability option auction. In 
these circumstances, generators holding reliability options are required to repay 
the difference between the market price and the strike price to the TSO. This 
shields consumers from the effects of high spot prices. Reliability options have 
been implemented in the New England electricity market and are proposed for 
the Italian market. 
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There is a danger that if the total amount of options cannot be sold without the 
participation of one particular firm, this firm will have both the ability and 
incentive to bid a high price for holding these options, which will lead to the 
auction clearing at a high price. The current capacity payment mechanism was 
not vulnerable to this exercise of market power, as the regulatory bodies 
determined the capacity pot. Therefore firms could not cause total capacity 
payments to rise through strategic behaviour. 
 
The regulators remain confident that appropriate measures can be identified to 
mitigate this potential strategic bidding which can be implemented along with the 
move to reliability options. However, there is no examination in the academic 
literature to date of the interaction of reliability options with a dominant firm or a 
low number of players. Indeed, much of the literature specifically ignores such 
issues when examining reliability options. These structural issues, which are 
present in the SEM, do not hold in other markets operating such capacity 
payment mechanisms.  
 
Given this background, the authors are of the view that the only feasible way to 
protect consumers from the exercise of market power in the capacity market is to 
regulate prices. The regulator should perform a pivotal supplier test every year, 
which ascertains whether there is one firm without which the total allocation of 
options cannot be sold. If such a pivotal supplier is found, the price and quantity 
bid into the reliability options auction by every unit owned by the pivotal supplier 
should be regulated.8 However, this would lead to the regulatory bodies 
determining not only the demand, but also a large portion of the supply curve of 
capacity in the I-SEM. Such a regulatory regime would also prove a significant 
administrative burden for the regulatory authorities. Finally, it could lead to a risk 
of litigation. 
 
One final question regarding reliability options relates to wind generation, which 
is of increasing importance in the SEM. At present, the capacity payment pot is 
divided amongst all available generators, including wind generators. The revenue 
wind generators receive from the capacity payment mechanism is taken into 
account when determining the subsidy to which wind generators are entitled.  
 
Under the new regime it is unlikely that wind generators will hold many if any 
reliability options, as periods of system stress may not coincide with positive wind 
output. Wind generators will therefore be reluctant to participate in the auction 
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at a low price, and are unlikely to hold these options. Thus, in determining 
whether a reliability options framework represents a net benefit for the 
consumer compared with the current regime, the total cost of the current 
mechanism should be compared with the cost of the new mechanism plus any 
addition to wind subsidies caused by the loss of capacity payments to wind 
generators. 
 
4. Conclusion 
The design of the Integrated Single Electricity Market raises concerns about the 
potential to realise a competitive outcome in the spot market, the retail market 
and the capacity market. The capability of forward trading to mitigate these risks 
is limited due to the nature of the Irish market. In a small market with limited 
interconnection capacity, liquid and transparent forward markets are unlikely to 
develop.  
 
Therefore we recommend that the dominant firm face regulation of its forward 
sales and also the prices and quantities it bids into the new capacity payment 
mechanism. Furthermore spot market prices and retail prices should be closely 
monitored and retail margins should be made publicly available. 
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